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Abstract. Many current HCI, social networking, ubiquitous computing, and 
context aware designs, in order for the design to function, have access to, or 
collect, significant personal information about the user.  This raises concerns 
about privacy and security, in both the research community and main-stream 
media. From a practical perspective, in the social world, secrecy and security 
form an ongoing accomplishment rather than something that is set up and left 
alone. We explore how design can support privacy as practical action, and 
investigate the notion of collective information-practice of privacy and 
security concerns of participants of a mobile, social software for ride sharing.  
This paper contributes an understanding of HCI security and privacy tensions, 
discovered while “designing in use” using a Reflective, Agile, Iterative 
Design (RAID) method.  
Keywords: Usable privacy and security, user experience based approaches, 
trust, design, HCI, participation. 
1 Introduction  
The growth in use of tracking and data mining technologies, in order to support 
human activities, increasingly raises concerns about privacy and security. In this 
paper we explore how to address these issues through a case study of agile 
ridesharing, in which we are investigating how to grow the practice of ad hoc shared 
vehicle rides arranged in real time through mobile social software.  Ridesharing 
software stands to benefit from tracking and data mining technologies, but the 
decision of whether to share information and share rides is inherently situated in 
social and cultural perspectives.  Dourish and Anderson argue for a move away from 
narrow and technically focused views of privacy and security toward a holistic view 
of situated and collective information practice [7]. Here, we attempt to build on this 
view by exploring how to evolve a secure collective information practice in the 
ongoing design of a successful ridesharing system.  
In explicating the need to consider collective information practice, Dourish and 
Anderson [7] consider alternative views: 
• Privacy as economic rationality – the trade-off between risk and reward; 
• Privacy as practical action – the practical detail of what people do to 
maintain privacy; and  
• Privacy as discursive practice – the way in which notions of privacy and 
security are used to categorize activities, events and settings, separating 
acceptable actions from unacceptable ones.  
In defining collective information practice, Dourish and Anderson argue for a 
greater focus on the latter two approaches, explaining that rational actor economic 
models “are inadequate as sole explanations of privacy and security practices because 
they fail to capture other symbolic and social values.”  Further, various studies have 
shown that humans do not make use of such rational decision making with respect to 
privacy and security [19,1].  Dourish and Anderson explain collective information 
practice as “collectively reproduced understandings of the ways information should 
be shared, managed and withheld.” 
The shift from privacy and security as disconnected and abstract technical 
practices, that can be setup and left alone, to ones that are performative, ongoing 
accomplishments, calls into question the separation between configuration and action 
that characterizes most interactive systems for privacy and security management. A 
collective information approach posits how can configuration and action be achieved 
together and collectively evolved? 
However, the story is complicated by the issue of technical infrastructure [20,2], 
because social and mobile software applications for ridesharing typically need to 
operate across existing internet based technical infrastructures, where security is 
protected under a model of risk and reward.  Given this situation, we pose the 
question, “What is a practical way to evolve a collective information practice for 
ridesharing building on existing infrastructures?”  
The approach that we propose is firstly a methodological one, drawing upon a 
reflective agile iterative development (RAID) method to grow a ridesharing culture, 
where the practicality of security can be devised collectively in the doing. Secondly, 
we examine the tensions in the existing approaches wherein technical capabilities may 
go beyond, be insufficient for or introduce conflicts with human needs, and explore 
how we might resolve these through evolution of collective information practice. 
Table 1 – Tensions between Technical and Cultural Practices 
Technical practices  Cultural practices 
Precise Tracking  versus Imprecision (negotiated and 
necessary disclosure) 
Prior information disclosure and setup  versus Action over time and in the 
moment 
Moderation  versus Referral and reputation  
Underlying infrastructure databases etc  versus Accountability and transparency 
 
A potential reason for the difference between technical practices and cultural 
practices, outlined in Table 1, is the disparity between the necessary probabilities of 
success for a cyber attack, compared with an attack in a social environment. Taking a 
rational economic view, an attack in a social environment (such as a robbery) may 
need a success rate of, at least, one in ten to be worthwhile for the perpetrator; 
whereas in the cyber-world a one-in-a-million attack can be seen as successful [17].   
Privacy and security are a pervasive aspect of how a system is designed and they 
cannot simply be grafted on [7].  We propose that, from a practical perspective, in the 
social world, security is an ongoing accomplishment rather than something that is set 
up and left alone, in agreement with Dourish and Anderson.  However, it was not 
clear how a design approach can work to support the ongoing accomplishment of 
security and privacy. In this paper we examine a design case study in order to explore 
how design can support privacy as practical action.  
2 Background 
Agile ridesharing aims to utilise the capability of social networks and technologies 
such as mobile phones and web applications, to facilitate people sharing vehicles and 
journeys.  Social technologies, such as SMS, email and web applications, provide the 
opportunity for people to offer and request impromptu rides in real time. 
Previously, most mobile phone and social-network-supported ridesharing, such as 
Zimride, Avego and GoLoco has been limited, due to being based on a particular 
phone or social network platform, due to insufficient ride matches, and due to 
following a standard carpooling paradigm of regular shared rides which is impractical 
for many people in many circumstances.  An investigation of existing rideshare 
approaches, in 2009, identified that there was a need, and potential based on new 
technologies, to create a system which allowed people to, in real time rather than a 
static matching program, arrange ride sharing based on extended social networks [4]. 
3 Related work 
The range of social network designs, all with privacy and security issues, is very 
broad.  Some examples are covered by the empirical work by Patil and Lai, who 
investigated the privacy settings of MySpace users [13].  Privacy is generally 
approached as a social consideration, whereas security is seen as a technical concern, 
though they are closely related [7].  We argue that technical security decisions in the 
interface and underlying infrastructure of internet communication have such an 
impact on privacy, that privacy needs to be considered from the perspective of the 
technical infrastructure and interaction with it, in order to ensure that the privacy 
expected from the social perspective is achieved. While we do not retreat from 
attempting to better support privacy as ongoing practice, the practicalities of 
interaction and design with technical infrastructure also need to be addressed. 
Lampe, Ellison and Steinfield, in their study of 1085 Facebook users which 
explored users’ expectations of privacy, also made important contributions in the 
exploration of users’ expectations [12].  They found that 90% of participants believed 
that no one from outside their university would read their Facebook page, and that 
97% of participants believed that no law enforcement agency would look at their 
Facebook page. 
Schechter et al. created a study in which bank websites were progressively 
changed, to become less and less secure, and the researchers determined whether the 
participants continued to enter their passwords into the website (which they did) [15].  
Similarly, De Keukelaere et al. and Sotirakopoulos et al. examined the effectiveness 
of security warnings, and their work provides succinct credible information that users 
were largely untrained in security and would not notice shortfalls in security [6,18]. 
The conclusion is that privacy must be designed in, and that the default privacy 
settings both need to be sufficient to ensure the expected privacy, without user 
education and input, and sufficient to allow the socio-technical system to work 
effectively, which creates a tension.  Sasse et al. argued that existing HCI techniques 
are sufficient to address security issues in the design of systems [14].  This being the 
case, it is important that the critical questions and concerns are identified.  Our study 
outlines the range of security and privacy issues identified in an ongoing, location-
specific, social networking application and draws attention to particular tensions. 
4 Iterative “design in use” approach  
From a methodological perspective, figuring out how to accomplish privacy and 
security in the doing points toward an approach that combines ethnographic study and 
iterative design. For this reason our agile rideshare project has adopted a reflective 
agile iterative development (RAID) method to explore the design requirements for an 
agile rideshare system [10].  
In summary, the design approach aims to:  
• Understand community practices through ethnographic fieldwork 
• Explore key design hypotheses by designing and deploying working 
investigatory prototypes for use by a segment of the community; 
• Gather fragments of ethnographic data from the prototype in use; 
• Build communities of use as the prototype is refined and extended; 
• Understand the factors that persuade or dissuade others from joining. 
The approach uses the simplest functioning technology prototypes deployed over 
an extended period, to understand how people use them in their daily lives to augment 
their activities. Thus the approach emphasizes understanding of use over feature 
provision and the functionality is extended in order to address pressing needs and 
emergent opportunities. We have employed a gradual growth strategy, as is 
recommended to ensure successful customer interaction [5], and in order to ensure 
due consideration is given to these issues. 
The rideshare prototype was initially developed for use among a small group of 
people who knew each other in order to understand basic aspects of the interaction 
paradigm, as reported in [9]. Following use of the simple prototype this group was 
able to consider practical aspects of sharing, privacy and security through use, and to 
consider how this needed to be enhanced in order to successfully grow the ridesharing 
community among known friends and also potentially to strangers. The prototyping 
approach is supported by interviews and group discussion. The initial rideshare 
prototype was designed to operate using a web browser, so that it could be accessed 
using any web-enabled phone, laptop and desktops, thus maximising the number of 
people who could participate in sharing using their own equipment. The prototype had 
a very limited functionality in that it only allowed people to send ride messages and 
information about seeking and offering rides. Even over a short four week trial of the 
first interface we observed a wide variety of practices and adoption, sharing and 
evolution of practices. In the beginning, most people sent formal ride messages by 
filling out form fields and few sent informal text messages because they were not 
revealed on the main page of the interface. However, once one participant realised 
that if no formal fields were filled out, only the informal text message would be 
revealed in the main page of the interface, the practice of informal messaging grew 
and it became the predominant form of communication. Collective information 
practice was at work. 
5 Emerging security and privacy tensions in agile ridesharing 
A number of emerging tensions between technical and cultural practices have been 
identified through collective information practice in our agile rideshare case study.  
These privacy and security tensions are listed in Table 1.  
5.1 Precise tracking versus imprecision 
While there are immense technical capabilities to track people’s location, participants 
had concerns about who could see their location, even at fleeting moments. For 
example, providing journey start and end times would allow others to identify when 
they were away from their home and their car.  Of particular concern was when both 
start and end of day rides, in opposite directions, were entered a day in advance, 
providing a clear understanding of when the participant would not be at home.  
However, a participant observed that even if return journeys were entered just once, 
then anyone with access to that data at any point in the future would find out a 
potentially ongoing commitment for the participant. 
These concerns have been identified as real, and are similar to concerns raised in 
the mainstream media in Norway regarding the EU Data Retention Directive for data 
from mobile telephones which allows for tracing of the user [21,22]. 
The ability to be imprecise was valued for other reasons. Through use of the 
prototype we have observed that people often give only scant information as much as 
is sufficient to open a conversation. This allowed them to make a vague proposition to 
a broad audience and then to discuss specifics with a few people on a need to know 
basis. Further to practices that we can see developing in the field, matchmaking 
literature, such as by [16], offers  lessons in obscuring or hiding the respective parties’ 
personal information, while still providing relevant connections between appropriate 
parties, when technical assistance to do this is needed.  But, most importantly, 
participants were able to control this information themselves in the doing, because the 
interface allowed such vagueness, by supporting free text messaging, rather than 
forcing specifics in formal fields.  
The tension of providing data which helps an application to function, such as 
journey start times and locations, versus the need to obscure what is shown both 
immediately and when creating a total picture over time, is a tension which must be 
investigated in many social networking and sensor enabled applications. 
5.2 Prior disclosure versus action over time 
There is a tendency in technical systems to ask for prior disclosure of profile 
information from people with a view that other users want this information to make 
decisions about sharing.  However, in direct conflict with this, many people do not 
wish to provide personal information about themselves, especially to strangers, and 
ideally not even to “potential ride sharers”, but rather only to the person who is going 
to be in the car with them.  The accuracy of profile information is anyway 
questionable. People are more likely to come to trust other people either through 
social connection, referral and reputation, or through their actions over time. 
Another facet of this tension is the need to acquire information to allow for greater 
privacy and security.  For example, some female participants stated they would only 
wish to ride with women. This is in keeping with the traditional practice that women 
can wait for other women to use rideshare across the East Bay of San Francisco 
bridge, a rideshare process which has been in place for 30 years [23].  Therefore, 
gender may be a reasonable question to ask potential rideshare participants.  
However, there was a strong reluctance by participants to enter gender and other 
information on the profile form, to the extent that we have now removed these 
questions from the profile form and provided a free text field instead (seen in Figure 1 
below).  This was seen as giving the users more control over what they chose to share. 
 Figure 1: Original profile page (left) and current profile page (right) 
Interestingly, although a key feature of agile ridesharing is the ability to bring 
unrelated people together, in the case of established groups, simply a recognisable 
nickname may be all that is required to fully detail a prospective journey. This 
introduced the human ethics consideration of “only collecting from the users the data 
required.”  Sometimes participants already know all details concerning gender, 
address, how to meet and what the vehicle looks like, and hence this data should not 
be compulsory to enter, since the system does not need to know this information, only 
the riders do.  Thus we see again collective information practices at work. 
5.3 Moderation versus referral and reputation 
Moderators, people who would vet potential new participants and scrutinise the rides 
posted to ensure acceptability, were discussed with the participants and the idea was 
discarded due to there being too much responsibility placed on one person.  Possible 
issues range from loss of life through to smaller offences such as pick pocketing or 
unsafe driving [23]. 
A participant used the example of a referral chain from her baby sitting circle.  In 
this case, a circle member could recommend a new potential circle member, and the 
circle would make a decision.  Having made the decision to include the new member, 
each participant chose who from the group they would let babysit their children, so 
there was another level of individual decision and control. 
Referral chains may have a similar responsibility problem in much the same way 
as moderators, though the relationship is more direct and hence the risk is reduced.  
Instead of moderators and referral chains, allowing people to make their own groups 
gives individuals the greatest control [9]. 
Also discussed was the use of reputation systems [11].  While the agile ride share 
system makes strong use of social networking technologies on the internet, the people 
who are travelling together may be work colleagues, neighbours, or family members.  
Therefore, there were mixed feelings about reputation systems, in which the person 
travelled with is assessed and the score advertised on the rideshare system, although 
this does have potential as a method that reveals community trust built over time [9]. 
5.4 Underlying infrastructure versus accountability and transparency 
At the lowest infrastructure level was the question, “Who has access to the database 
of user and ride information?”  Attention was drawn to the concern that although the 
current interface protected the privacy of the individual, once the information was in 
the database a future design may make the information accessible. This led to 
questions of how to hide the information even from the designers, while allowing 
filtering and searching.  Possible solutions, such as predicate cryptography (which 
allows users with the relevant attributes to view a message, while all other users may 
not), create a tension due to a lack of flexibility with future designs and the lack of 
control and visibility by the creators of the application. 
A further tension exists with the expectation participants had that the service would 
be provided free of charge.  For a prototype application with a small group of users, 
the design, development, maintenance, sending of SMSs to participants regarding 
rides, and connection and storage infrastructure costs may be included in a research 
budget.  For a large application with millions of users, these costs would be 
considerable, and would typically be offset by either advertising with tracking 
cookies, or else by accumulating information about the participants and providing that 
information to interested parties, which may be the participants themselves (such as 
ride predictions for best times and places for rides).  Both scenarios impact privacy. 
Finally, the issue, common amongst social networking applications, was identified 
that it is difficult for users to view what others see about them.  Further, there was the 
realisation that participants had no control over what other participants post.  For 
example, even though participant RLady consciously makes a decision to never 
publish when she was not going to be home, another participant could write “Picking 
RLady up from her place at 10am.” The above three concerns are indicative of 
tensions between individual or collective social practices that are accountable on a 
small scale and the implications of supporting these practices with an underlying 
technical infrastructure that has the capability to easily support large scale sharing of 
information.  
6 Conclusion  
We developed an agile ridesharing prototype mobile social software system and 
trialled it in order to explore the collective information practices that might be 
developed through its use in organising ridesharing. The paper contributes a practical 
example of designing for collective information practice, an approach proposed by 
Dourish and Anderson. A number of emerging security and privacy tensions between 
technical and cultural practices have been identified through examining the collective 
information practice in ridesharing.  These tensions are: precise tracking versus 
imprecision; prior disclosure and setup versus action over time and in the moment; 
moderation versus referral and reputation; and underlying infrastructure versus 
accountability and transparency. A key aspect of design involves paying attention to 
people’s practices and matching the system technical capability to these practices, so 
that technical capabilities support growth of collective information practice and do not 
introduce conflicts with human needs. 
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